IDENTITY AND SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATIONS OF POLITICAL VALUES: THE EXAMPLE OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN KOSOVSKA MITROVICA

Olivera S. Marković-Savić[1] and Snežana S. Popić[2]

University of Priština, temporarily seated in Kosovska Mitrovica, Faculty of Philosophy, Sociology Department, Kosovska Mitrovica, Serbia
[1]e-mail: markovic.olivera@gmail.com
[2]e-mail: snezanapopic@gmail.com

Abstract

Collective identification constitutes one part of a society's dialectic in which individuals participate as actors, tending to define their social world in accordance with the objectively determined meanings of the social reality. Collectivity assumes the sense of belonging, preceded by the creation of identity by means of subjective and objective dimensions of social reality. By participating in dual internalization of not only proper identity but also social world, social actors are positioned differently within the so-called symbolic universe. This is particularly aided by the process of internalization of the institutional order and institutionally based subuniverses. Social organizations can intentionally and unintentionally influence the creation of multiple loyalties, which are expressed in the diversity of collectivities and identities. Taking into account the social ideal as a motive for identification amongst actors who perform similar social roles and are members of similar or different social origins and collectivity, it is expected that they will share certain material and symbolic means with certain solidarity and loyalty. This paper discusses symbolic representations of political values of 'brotherhood', 'unity', 'freedom', 'equality', and 'democracy' in specific social organizations that were active in Kosovska Mitrovica during the socialist period. Using the socio-historical perspective and on the basis of analysis of the presented secondary data about the way these organizations function, the aim of this paper is to describe the use of the said values by both Serbian and Albanian nationals during the development of the socialist self-government in Kosovo and Metohija.

Key words: identity, symbolic representations, internalization, social organizations, Kosovska Mitrovica

Introduction

Societies make history, but history is made of people of certain identities, so historical social structures give birth to *types* of identities, recognizable in individual cases, which are manifested in everyday life. P. Berger and N. Luckmann considered everyday life to be presented to everybody as the reality *par excellence* or as the supreme reality – due to

the fact that 'the tension of consciousness' is highest within it; it is life in the state of complete alertness (Berger & Luckmann, 1992, p. 39). Using the language of E. Durkheim, these theorists of social constructionism believed that institutions oppose the individual as 'indisputable facts' – they will survive as objective reality regardless of whether (s)he understands their purpose and mode of operation or not. Such 'forced facts', that is, derivatives of integration, are revealed as the authority over the individual and his/her temptations to redefine them (Ibid, p. 84). The roles are 'types of participants' in the context of materialized stock of knowledge, which participants of one community share, and by playing the roles, they participate in the social world as the subjectively real world (Ibid, p. 95). Legitimation and integration imply a complimentary performance of roles, which would lead to a successful connection of various representations into one cohesive unity that will create some meaning. As a process of 'explaining' and 'justi-fying', legitimation also contains the cognitive and normative (value) element.[1] The third branch of legitimation consists of theoretical judgments in rudimentary form, while the fourth is constructed by 'symbolic universes'. Thus, the symbolic universes are the highest level of reflexive integration of institutional orders and individual biographies, as a space in which the whole world is created (Ibid, p. 119). Symbolic universes are 'protective arches above the institutionalized order', creating a certain continuum that sums up the past, the present, and the future with the established memory (Ibid, p. 125). This means that more individuals share the collective social time and 'the overall perspective which intersubjectively connects the series of situations into a whole' (Ibid, p. 156). In addition, internalization happens only when identification happens. The signif-icant 'other' plays an important role here. Therefore, this is the issue of dialectic between identification by others and self-identification. Within the secondary socialization, 'internalization of the institutionalized and institutionally-based 'sub-worlds' is fulfilled, which thus only make 'partial but more or less cohesive realities' opposed to the 'base-world' built in primary socialization (Ibid, p. 164, 165). By applying, in this case, analytical analogy with the Marxist understanding of society through 'base and upgrade', Berger and Luckmann offered a model of explanation of the types of sociability and its forms of identity. Identities can thus also be transformed into variable expressions of counter-identities, which depend on the needs and possibilities of redefining the meaning from the so-called stocks of common knowledge, the gap between objective and subjective reality, the absence of legitimacy and integration, and so on. With regard to the socialist society, especially the Yugoslav society, there are some unfinished analyses on the topics of (mis)use of 'brotherhood and unity', expressed on the one hand in the demands for preservation of the democratic principle of multi-ethnic tolerance, equality, collectiveness, and freedom, and on the other hand, in the demands for national affirmation and cultural development of different (other) nationalities. Brotherhood and unity are understood as political values that implicitly contain one part of the meaning of democracy. Thus, the positioning of the political systems within the modern world order is practically inseparable from the question of democracy and fulfillment of its constitutional principles. The process of spreading democracy, which there is now talked about more than ever before, both in scientific circles and in the media, even in political

---

[1] Here, the knowledge precedes the values: "Legitimacy 'explains' the institutional order by attributing cognitive validity to its objective meanings. Legitimacy justifies the institutional order by giving normative dignity to its practical imperatives" (Berger & Luckmann, 1992, p. 116).

leaflets, is a part of contemporary global social-political movements. Today the significance of democracy, among other things, is recognized on the basis of evaluation of the ratio of negative consequences of former political systems, which have spawned the so-called transitional 'post-societies'. Such an approach often strengthens the use of the blurred dichotomy 'authoritarian vs. democratic'. The rigid opposition between the idea of equality and the concept of freedom is surpassed in the normative meaning of democracy, which, as an idea,

> cherishes the original meaning of political life as 'social', essential, which saw the light of day in the first republics of the world's history, as life of the people who are free and equal (Stevanović, 2008, p. 25).

A full-fledged democracy would be the one that is understood as a goal as well as a means, while holding both freedom and equality as its value substrate. However, it is not before uniting the two ideals that the most important principle of the contemporary (democratic) political systems is accomplished – the principle of *autonomy*. The attempts to fulfill the criteria of 'personal autonomy and the rule of the people' resulted in a large number of political systems that achieved this only to a small extent, so the meaning of democracy in the contemporary world is most frequently expressed in the form of 'limited and indirect democracy – liberal democracy' (Heywood, 2004, p. 768). Symbolic representation of the political values thus becomes the subject of interest of modern scientists, and so implies the use of symbols, events, personalities, the media, and so on with the purpose of creating and confirming the legitimacy of the given values. Representation is the key dimension of the political presentations, but here social organizations also have important roles. In her book 'The Concept of Representation', Hanna Pitkin distinguishes between representations on two grounds – representation in the sense of 'advocating for' and representation in the sense of 'working for' (according to Stokke & Selboe, 2009). Within this classification scheme, symbolic representation implies commitment to a social group. Symbols can be arbitrary or natural, but what is important for symbolic representation is to what degree people believe in the symbol (Ibid, p. 59). Symbolic representation can be understood as a practice of constructing social groups and the legitimization of their interests, i.e. as a political practice that places these representations in the context of political economy and power (Ibid, p. 60). Its functionality also depends on the type of political culture.[2] The political culture[3] of ex-Yugoslavia was shaped by certain ethno-national conflicts, through which the members of certain nationalities opposed the institutionalized use of the basic principles of the ruling ideology. First of all, dissatisfaction of the Albanians with their position in Yugoslavia was not only expressed in the streets of big cities, within the student population, but was also present among the workers in numerous work organizations. Demanding an equal representation of their countrymen at all levels of government, decision-making, and production within work organizations, members of this national

---

[2] Political culture is defined as a 'politically complex system or network of values, beliefs, styles, symbols, and patterns of behavior, which are developed within the processes of socialization and crystallization of collective experiences and 'memories' of the members of one community about politics, that is, about general terms of their life within the community' (Matić, 1998, p. 304).

[3] Considering Almond's typology of political culture, it can be said that communist ideology showed some creative potential, but, through its embodiment as a form of social-political community, it paved the way for a submissive political culture.

minority had gradually sought out the protection of their cultural rights on all state levels. Socioeconomic divisions were interwoven with ethno-national divisions, and this problem affected the industrial development in Kosovo and Metohija (K&M).[4]On many occasions, the communist government tried to devise and apply appropriate strategies and action plans that were supposed to help prevent any 'counter-revolutionary acts' and preserve Kosovo as a socialist autonomy of equal and free people, united on the basis of brotherhood, equality, and solidarity. This situation is illustrative in the example of Trepča mine, as one of the most important industrial combines in K&M. We will highlight specific data with regards to Trepča industrial complex and the issue of the position of Serbs and Albanians, as well as the relationship between them. At the same time, we will also present certain measures of the League of Communists (CCLCY; CCLCS), which were aimed at solving the structural problem of K&M, especially the question of the Albanian national affirmation.

The Development of a model of socialist self-government in Kosovo and Metohija

The early period of the Yugoslav socialist model in the entire former country, and also in the northern part of K&M, is characterized by very harsh conditions left over by the destruction during World War II. First of all, it was very important to feed all of the people, and then to rebuild the economic and industrial infrastructure, which was laid to waste by the Wehrmacht army during their retreat. However, the primary task was to mobilize the manpower in the PLA (People's Liberation Army) to fight against the remnants of the enemy ballistic and Chetnik army, i.e. to suppress the counter-revolution in K&M. As will be shown below, mobilization for the needs of the industry was met with great resistance from the peasantry; however, mobilization to reinforce the units of the PLA did receive a remarkable response (Jevtimijević, 2008, p. 291).

One of the reasons for this lay in a clear need for defense in times of danger to the local population before the mass strikes of the Albanian Quislingian formations, 'which were backed by the greatest part of the Albanian population from the River Drenica area' (Ibid, p. 291). Simultaneously, the task was to seize individuals and groups of the broken Chetnik corps, mostly members of the Second Chetnik Kosovo Corps. These units represented an ideological threat to the newly-established authority.[5]Another reason, according to Jevtimijević, was that for the people from this region participating in wars for liberation it was the patriotic duty for which no other benefits are expected but to be remembered by it and to continue the tradition of fighting against the invaders. In favor of this claim, it is stated that, from 87 fighters from the Banjska municipality, only 19 regulated their official status as the fighters in the people's liberation war (Ibid, p. 292).

After the initial enthusiasm generated by the liberation and the vigor it brought in engaging the population in the restoration of the country, there was a retrograde moment. Namely, immediately after the war, Tito maintained intensive and proactive relations with Albania,[6] and since Stalin considered this country his sphere of interest, he requested

---

[4]   Hereinafter, the abbreviation K&M will be used instead of the full name Kosovo and Metohija.

[5]   'Within the overall measures for the liquidation of the remains of the defeated Quislingian formations, the Operational Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army Kosmet troops publicly, through posters, called for all 'renegade Shqiptars and Chetniks' to report to the authorities thru March 10, 1945'. (Jevtimijević, 2008, p. 294).

[6]   The same as with Bulgaria and Greece, where a civil war broke out, his dream was a Balkan federation, which did not suit the great world powers.

from the Yugoslav government the harmonization of foreign policy actions with the Kremlin. As Tito did not fulfill this request, on the historical June 28, 1948 (St Vitus Day), the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was excluded from the Cominform. Because of the harsh condemnation of the USSR, Albania withdrew from further cooperation with Belgrade. The situation became so volatile that it resulted in the shortage of food in the entire country (until material aid arrived from the West in the form of loans) and complete cessation of the cultural relationships with Albania, which came to life after the war.

At the same time, there were ongoing processes which paved the way to modernization, such as restoration, renewal, and construction of the industries, which implied mass migrations from rural into urban areas, and the industry became the meeting point of ethnic and national groups and peoples. 'Between 1945 and 1953, 1.5 million people left the countryside in favor of living in the cities. Additional 800,000 people became occasional industrial or commuting workers' (Kamberović, according to Čalić, 2013, p. 230). Employment in the industry sector was not a lucrative way of earning at the time, and the peasantry indeed strongly resisted these rapid and radical changes. The situation in Kosovska Mitrovica region confirmed this claim. Namely, Trepča had a significant role to play in the production plans, considering that it participated with 2% in the Yugoslav export and with 10% in the total Serbian export (Jevtimijević, 2008, p. 326). However, the problem this industry faced was the lack of work force. On that issue, Jevtimijević stated:

> County and local boards within municipalities keep this an open question on the daily agenda. The sending of workers was first planned as voluntary, and later it somehow turned into a mobilization of people. However, people from the countryside, burdened with inherited stagnancy and attachment to the land, could hardly be separated from the land. They did not even consider any perspective in the industry and mining, as there was hardly anything that could be obtained with money, except with ration stamps… People were simply forced to go there to work. There are documented examples of people jumping out of trucks on their way to Trepča and going back to the village (Ibid, p. 326).

However, in time and with additional benefits for industrial workers (in terms of regular provisions for workers, better health insurance, and commuting) the relationship of the peasantry towards industrial labor began to change; nevertheless, they would remain living in the countryside with families for a while, but with agriculture as their secondary profession:

> People went to work outside their municipality area, but not to settle there. People commuted 20 to 30km daily from their home to their place of work, but all their earnings were invested into expanding their households in the countryside, where they erected buildings and expanded their estates by clearing land for cultivation or buying the land. The inherited attachment to the land prevented them from bringing their place of work and place of residence closer together (Ibid, p. 336).

The state invested a lot into reducing illiteracy in the countryside and into introducing mandatory primary education. The activities to promote literacy for the population were intended both for men and women who outgrew the primary education. Jevtimijević

states that in the Zvečan county in the 1947/1948 school year, 1,526 women and almost as many men were taught how to read and write, while in the entire K&M territory in the same school year the total number of people who were taught how to read and write was 42,172 (Ibid, p. 325). Literacy and health culture courses, as well as legalization of abortion, lead to the second great modern phenomenon – the decrease of the birth rate. Thus, the rapid process of industrialization accompanied by other forms of modernization in this region, as well as in the entire country, was guided through strong pressure by the partisan leadership.

Another very important modernization process was in fact the main task of the Yugoslav socialist government in K&M and throughout the country – the society was to be organized on a multi-ethnic basis. In youth brigades, the Communist Party, and the Yugoslav People's Army, which represented the embodiment of the ideal of 'brotherhood and unity', the identity of people was supposed to be formed on the principle of belonging to the Yugoslav socialist self-governing local community, the so-called 'self-government'. The most important among the myths, symbols, and rituals were the partisans and other symbols of the partisan fight, in which all Yugoslav nations participated and upon which rested the principal legitimacy of the Communist Party and its lifelong and inviolable leader Tito, that is, his personality cult (Marković-Savić, 2019, p. 306). 'Brotherhood and unity' was more than an ideological motto; it was the question of the highest patriotic value.

Nevertheless, 'the golden age' of the 1960s, reflected in political liberalization, the success of industrialization, international relationships, and favorable geostrategic conditions of Yugoslavia, began to reveal the cracks in the ideology on which the system of 'brotherhood and unity' was based. There were two ongoing parallel processes, economic and ideological-political: Yugoslavia suffered a negative industrial growth but the personal income grew. 'Since then, Yugoslavia lived above its possibilities: the deficit in the trade balance and inflation were increasing, and the economic growth was decreasing' (Bilandžić-Vukadinović, according to Čalić, 2013, p. 281). In such a climate, discussions began among the republics about the two essentially opposed positions: strengthening the republics at the expense of the federation (advocated by Slovenia and Croatia, 'the state should invest by the criterion of profitability, and should not pursue a policy of development of underdeveloped parts of the country') as opposed to greater control of the state (centralism) 'with the aim of a more efficient overall economic policy and encouragement for the development of the poor parts of the country'. On top of these problems, another phenomenon of concern emerged – unemployment. At the same time, even though the government and the Party promoted good international relationships, the state experienced an internal rift, of which regular citizens were unaware due to a lack of information about the developments inside the elite circles. Namely, nationalism was not easy to sustain and prejudice and war traumas were too deep, so the supreme arbiter (Tito) used his authority to constantly remind them to 'cherish brotherhood and unity as the apple of one's eye'. One group of Kosovo's leaders who never truly gave up the idea of accession of K&M to Albania and whose ideas found a foothold and support with extreme Albanians could not have implemented and maintained such ideas on their own had it not been for another important factor – the attitude of the Central Committee of Serbia and Yugoslavia, which did not want to tackle even the hints of problems in K&M fearing a misunderstanding among the management and the disclosure of these conflicts,

which would disrupt the notion of monolithic leadership within the League of Communists. To all this, Jevtimijević added,

> such behavior of a number of Serbian personnel from Kosovo and Metohija represented the typical example of striving to preserve the cushy positions in the government and winning new points in the announced reconstruction of the government in Serbia (Jevtimijević, 2008, p. 381).

Brotherhood and Unity vs. Freedom and Equality in social organizations in Kosovska Mitrovica

Kosovska Mitrovica was a smaller industrial town in the socialist period, coming a long way from an old town and 'kasaba (kasbah) of the pre-socialist age' to an urban and administrative center renamed Titova Mitrovica (Tito's Mitrovica). Within the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (its full name from 1974 to 1990), Kosovska Mitrovica also bore the name Titova Mitrovica during the 1981–1991 period. It is possible to follow the development of this town from the 1950s to the 1980s, when urban planning was based on the socialist model of urban development mostly in the area 'north of the Ibar River' (see Troch, 2018, pp. 33–61). The preliminary analysis showed that the economic, sociocultural, and political characteristics of this urban center were significantly shaped by the influence of the development of Trepča. Trepča, as the industrial mining, metallurgical, and chemical production complex, was the origin of not only economic but also sociocultural security, which was mirrored in residential and educational privileges for many citizens of the north K&M, regardless of their nationality. Trepča became the leader in the production of lead and zinc in the country in the second half of the 20th century and an important distributor of silver and gold, with almost the highest number of employees at 20,000 (Marković-Savić, 2018, p. 12). It functioned this way until the late 1990s, as the ethnic turmoil affected Trepča equally harshly as the rest of K&M. After 1989 and the final strike of the miners of Albanian nationality from Stari Trg (today's part of South Mitrovica), Albanians left Trepča in large numbers, either forcefully or voluntarily. As an industrial conglomerate, Trepča functioned at its best until the 1970s – before a massive exodus of over 300 workers, mainly of Serbian and Montenegrin nationalities – although it was still formally operational until August 2000.[7] Trepča has remained nonfunctional ever since and, as such, has become the subject of the dispute between the Serbian and Albanian governments. During its operation, the motives for Serbian–Albanian conflicts changed from economic to nationally-motivated ones and vice versa. The following data point to the division and problems of social layering, which initially manifested vertically – between the administrative staff on one hand and the semi-qualified and non-qualified workers, prevalently Albanians, on the other hand. In the beginning of the 1950s and 1960s, Trepča was an attractive job opportunity not only for the local experts but also for many experts from other European countries. By the end of the 1960s, Trepča hired around 11,000 people, but the occupational structure was as follows: 6,000 production workers with only 441 with vocational education and only 86 with higher education (Troch, 2019, p. 221). High salaries, different loan funds, and

---

[7] The data provided by B. Petranović showed that from 1939 to 1974 the total number of employees in former Yugoslavia increased by about four times, reaching 4,514,000 employees, whereby 97% of the total number of employees worked in the social sector, mostly in industry and mining, trade and hospitality, cultural and social activities. During the 1980s, there were around 700,000 Yugoslav people abroad (Petranović, 1988, p. 431).

social benefits convinced many experts to spend their entire careers in Trepča.[8] A research recently conducted among the retired workers and engineers of Albanian nationality, who still live in K&M, showed that they considered such stimulation to be proportionally 10:1 in favor of highly qualified experts, who were given around 3,000 apartments and 600 houses in total built from Trepča's funds in Kosovska Mitrovica and Zvečan (Ibid.). In addition, the Albanians also thought that the management became corrupted, citing different examples referring to Serbian managers. The Albanians had a general attitude that the League of Communists artificially created the social elite in Trepča according to political criteria by employing experts and managers of Serbian or other non-Albanian origin, mostly from Belgrade. Nevertheless, the data available to the management of the League of Communists showed that the Albanians were poorly educated at the time due to which they as well as other nationalities were offered a package of measures with different scholarships for training and secondary education.[9] During 1961/62, the first technical schools were opened in Mitrovica and Priština, and Trepča began to grant educational scholarships. In the late 1970s, Trepča, as one of the founders, initiated the establishment of the Technical Faculty in Priština as well as the Faculty of Metallurgy in Kosovska Mitrovica in order to generate proper staff for its further development. Nevertheless, the Albanians constantly complained that the Serbian ethnic community was privileged and that all Albanians' requests for the same scholarships were usually declined by the human resources department. A very important role in all of this was played by the Brioni plenum in 1966, where the 'violence and discrimination' towards Albanian workers in K&M were openly discussed, accusing the Trepča management of national inequality and the prevalence of the Serbs among the white collar workers (Ibid, p. 222). Human resources continued to maintain the party ideology and principles, by which it was not allowed to set a national criterion before the quality criterion, considering that this disproportion had been caused by the lack of expert personnel of Albanian nationality. Consequently, an analysis of the employee structure in Trepča was performed, revealing that the number of those with completed vocational studies increased from 86 to 260, meaning the number of Albanians in the management structure improved (Ibid); however, the altered employment structure influenced the gradual exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins. The Central Union of Workers reached a decision to solve the staff problems through a more balanced national representation of workers, considering for example that the university educated staff comprised around 70% Serbs and only 9% Albanians. According to this ambitious plan of the Central Union of Workers, the employee organization should have reflected the principle of the population's composition (Ibid, p. 223). The Union wanted to ensure a sense of complete equality and freedom, so one of the changes was to impose bilingual administrative correspondence and company's documentation. After these decisions, the riots did not subside, but there were cases when the revolt in the whole country was simultaneously

---

[8]   Social benefits were part of the socialist policy in all of Yugoslavia, so that during the mid-1970s each resident had 13m² of living space at their disposal, while the Yugoslav residential fund had 5,000,300 apartments by the end of the 1970s (Petranović, 1988, p. 422).

[9]   Statistical data from 1948 showed that the number of the members of Albanian nationality settled in the territory of Yugoslavia was significantly smaller (750,431) compared to the number of Serbian residents (6,547,117) (Petranović, 1988, p. 313). At the time, in Serbia only Albanian was spoken by 523,011 people, who shaped the majority population in K&M in the second half of the twentieth century. The number of 'people speaking Albanian' in Belgrade from 1960 until 1990 significantly increased, but then their total number declined not only in the capital of Serbia but also in the territory of Serbia proper (Mandić, Sivački, 2015, p. 264).

accompanied by smaller incidents between Serbian and Albanian groups in work organizations. As early as 1968/69, 336 Serbian and Montenegrin employees left Trepča, 70 of whom were managers, while most of them were engineers, technicians, and highly qualified workers (Ibid.). The general manager at the time declared that the high socialist principle of unity and equality of the peoples and nationalities suddenly turned into a direct confrontation on the national basis, considering the insistence on a quick resolution independent of technological and staff capacities (Ibid, p. 224). In spite of everything, the human resources policy strategy was adopted from 1967 to 1970, with a target group of 2,000 non-qualified workers, mostly of Albanian nationality, employed in the mining and metallurgy departments. Trepča then granted 114 scholarships, 70% of which were given to Albanians, while 580 workers were financed to receive training in business schools for qualified workers (Ibid.). It was suggested that the Serbs were opposed to these measures, but there were numerous interpretations of such rudimentary changes. On the one hand, the League of Communists believed that irredentist and nationalist pretensions quickly consumed the Albanian population, starting with the intelligentsia and the elite, which controlled secondary schools and universities, and soon started to spread among workers and peasants; on the other hand, the Serbs were accused of misuse of their political power for the purpose of strengthening the position of their people, even though the principles of the company stated that the issues of nationality must be put aside. The Albanians believed that, 'instead of brotherhood and unity' and socialist self-government, only the principle of mono-nationalistic self-government was embodied. There was a tension among the Serbs and a desire to leave, because they realized that they could be replaced only on the basis of their nationality.[10] The operation of this company could not avoid the problem of ethnic nepotism, which later also greatly contributed to the decrease in productivity, considering a frequent change of employee structure on the ethnic basis (Serbian or Albanian). Even though the data from that period suggest that Kosovo had a very young population, with a high percentage of both full- and part-time students of the University of Priština, there was a very distinctive lack of personnel and university students from the technical and natural-mathematical sciences.[11] The Trepča management tried to resolve this shortage by co-financing the establishment of the necessary faculties in K&M in the early 1970s. The Albanians thought that Trepča management was delegated on the basis of political eligibility and that the same principle (political, not professional) was used in the staff hiring policy. That is why the Albanians' request represented the appreciation of the national criterion even though it was thought that mostly communist Albanians were given the management seats in unions and some production sectors. Their role in such organizations was helpful in confronting the current status and amendments in normative acts, which reflected extremely centralist decision-making by their estimate, and in asking for the fulfillment of requirements for including

[10] In the meantime, there was an anonymous survey conducted by the magazine issued by Trepča in order to obtain the data about the attitudes of employees towards the changes and especially towards the departure of highly trained and educated workers. According to the data of Peter Troch, the obtained attitudes can be classified into four problem categories: 1) lack of loyalty and work ethics among younger employees; 2) lack of respect toward experts, very poor social conditions of work, and conflicts with production workers; 3) economic difficulties of the company and financial limits for the employees; 4) national tensions and insecurities over job positions due to the influx of Albanians (Troch, 2019, p. 225).

[11] This problem was also noticed for all of Yugoslavia, which had over 500,000 graduated students in the period from 1945 to 1974. In the socialist period, social sciences and humanities prevailed over vocational, technological, and natural-mathematical sciences in higher education (Petranović, 1988, p. 423, 424).

all workers into self-government flows, from management and decision-making to the distribution of production income (Ibid, p. 14). Later, after the great Albanian demonstrations, it was precisely the Union of Communists that accused first of all its communist management of having allowed the influence of 'irredentists' and 'Albanian chauvinists'.

The Union of Communists tended to (re)define and exercise precise control and development measures of K&M, as a region that exemplifies the socio-political community of brotherhood and unity, democracy, freedom, and human rights. One of the most important platforms was called 'Political Platform for the Action of the League of Communists in the Development of the Socialist Self-government, Brotherhood and Equality, and Unity in Kosovo' (1981), and it was adopted on the 22nd meeting of the CCLCY, on the 17th of November, 1981. The second important document was published on the 15th of February, 1990, entitled 'The Program for the Realization of Peace, Freedom, Equality, Democracy, and Prosperity of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo'. Both platforms point to general and special reasons for the 'rejection' of the idea of brotherhood and equality, unity, and openness, which the Central Committee identified due to the continued demands of the Albanians. The Committee did not recognize these causes in the social discontent of the Albanian people, but in the organized indoctrination conducted over them by foreign 'pro-fascist enemies'. In addition, certain causes were derived from the generally poorer socio-economic development of the region, which had the almost highest share of industrial investment in the entire country, but also the lowest share of income in the social product. K&M survived owing to the funds, which, according to these platforms, would still be active. The main objective of the Communist Union was not only to restore Albanian faith in the activities of socialist self-governing society, but also to show them the concrete socio-political advantages achieved by the province of K&M up to that point, primarily owing to the historical connection between the Serbian and Albanian people, the benefits of which they would continue to promote, while respecting the freedom and human rights in all spheres of social life. Certain measures demonstrate the interest of the League of Communists in strengthening the cooperation of the two peoples through different institutional channels – economic, social, political, and cultural. However, certain measures to prevent the activities of Albanian irredentists had been highlighted, such as initiation of the proceedings to seize their property, strip them of their citizenship, and expel them from the country. Among other things, there was a plan to take control over secondary and higher education in K&M from the 'Albanian indoctrinators', together with nurturing cultures of all nationalities. At the time, there were about 40,000 students in K&M.[12] The platform identified Kosovo as a unique case in the world where the national minority enjoyed exclusive rights and which sought to protect at all costs the values of equality and brotherhood, cooperation and democracy, associations, and solidary cooperation. These measures encouraged stronger cooperation between the Serbs and the Albanians, learning of each other's language, and equality of the Albanian and the Serbo-Croatian language. In view of the expressed problem of unemployment in this

---

[12] The plan pertaining to education involved unified plans and curricula, stimulating the (Serbian) staff who wished to come to work to the University of Priština and establish the scientific youth, and stimulating the young who wished to study and later work in K&M. Yugoslav society allocated about 3% of the gross national product of the social economy of the whole country from 1966 to 1984 to stimulate the development of its underdeveloped republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, as the province with the share of 63.4% of these incentive funds (SORS, 1986, p. 28).

region, the Platform also discussed the adoption of legal solutions for the reduction of birth rates in K&M.[13]

Instead of a conclusion

By implementing these measures, the League of Communists sought to influence the work of various social organizations in K&M. They regarded the Albanians' demands for secession and 'national closure' as unfounded, pointing out that full freedom was only possible in a democratized and self-governing society of united nations in which the 'working man' is the most important social entity.[14] The League also pointed out that the problem of Kosovo indicated that 'there was a lack of daily and firm connection of communists to the citizens, the working people, and the youth' (Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1981, p. 17). Numerous measures were taken, but they could not be implemented, as civil unrest in the territory of former Yugoslavia occurred a year after the adoption of the second Platform (Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, 1990). In the 1990s, the Albanians sought to boycott state institutions, and finally a bloody ethnic conflict emerged as an expression of the struggle for the territory of K&M. Kosovo is now a so-called independent state and is included among other post-communist countries. The post-Yugoslav area represents the territory of independent countries, created predominantly on a mono-ethnic basis, retaining only a nostalgic connection with communism, which only formally promoted the principles of 'brotherhood and unity'. Studies on political values in post-communist societies show that the ideology of communism has been largely replaced by the ideology of nationalism (Miller, White & Heywood, 1998). Even though there were many examples of brotherhood and equality, that is, the ideal of Yugoslavism, it did not succeed in resolving the question of inter-ethnic mistrust, which strongly separated the members of different nationalities. The ideal of Yugoslavism proved in practice to be too 'regime' and 'ministerial', while at the same time the concept of freedom was understood as inseparable from the concept of the national state (Šutović, 2008, p. 256). It is apparent that the complete dysfunction of Yugoslavia was due to a number of reasons, not only cultural and political, but also socio-economic.

Whether we are talking about a social being and a 'practitioner' or the principle of autonomy, due to the lack of conditions necessary for their fulfillment, individuals will endeavor to reconstruct the symbolic universe and establish new foundations for integrating their and the roles of others into one cohesive entity. Thus, the socialist period of the Yugoslav society is portrayed as a period of politics trying to redefine collective identities, while using democratic principles as a means of applying the basic principles of supranational identity – brotherhood and unity. Even though the eponym 'Titoism' was ingrained in the SFRY, denoting the cult of the ruler but not the ideological course (Kuljić, 2010, p. 225), Yugoslavia tended to execute the social self-government based on the principles of the policy of civil identity in all of its six republics and among the five

---

[13] In addition, certain municipalities in K&M were selected as particularly important for the action of the policies directed against the emigration of non-Albanian population.

[14] Sociologists from the socialist period pointed to the mentality of 'universal craftsman' as the basic figure of Yugoslav industrialization, 'for whom the overvaluing of physical labor, understanding of the 'equality of all stomachs' ('egalitarian syndrome' or 'flat-rate pensions'), and 'rental psychology' combined with 'egotistic conscience' were typical (Petranović, 1988, p. 429).

nations, albeit acting from a position of an underdeveloped political culture. Another example was the Albanian national identity constructed on the foundation of the idea of 'civil religion of *Albanianhood'* (Duijzings, 2005, p. 215), which remained distant from the idea of the civil religion of Yugoslavism. Political ideology as such was not sufficient; what lacked here was a political culture as 'the integral part of the cultural social structure', which 'develops over a longer period of learning and internalization of people's experiences about the political environment and issues that are jointly resolved' (Matić, 1998, p. 304). It is clear that there is no ideology without political values, but these types of values are simultaneously a part of a wider political culture. For J. Habermas, the principle of citizenship is the basic form of political identity (Habermas, 2002), while the political culture is widely seen as the most general form of political integration of society. The problem of Yugoslav political culture emanates from the fact that Yugoslav nationalities had an uneven influence on the conditions of their cultural development inside the socialist federal country. Today, members of these nationalities have assumed the role of participants freed from traditional institutions and norms, but dependent on the labor market and modern institutions, which are a part of the contradictory process of socialization and which influence the formation of social identity in individualized cultures (Beck, 2001).

References

Beck, U. (2001). *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. Beograd: Filip Višnjić. [in Serbian]

Berger, P., Luckmann, N. (1992). *The Social Construction of Reality*. Zagreb: Naprijed. [in Croatian]

Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Session 22. (1981). *The political platform for the action by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the development of socialist self-government, brotherhood and unity, and community in Kosovo*. Beograd: Komunist. [in Serbian]

Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. Session 3. (1990). *The Program for the Realization of Peace, Freedom, Equality, Democracy and Prosperity of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo*. Beograd: Komunist. [in Serbian]

Čalić, M. J. (2013). *A History of Yugoslavia in the 20th Century*. Beograd: Clio. [in Serbian]

Duijzings, G. (2005). *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek. [in Serbian]

FSO. (1986). *Yugoslavia 1945–1985: a Statistical Review*. Beograd: Federal Statistical Office. [in Serbian]

Habermas, J. (2002). Citizenship and national identity: some reflections on the future of Europe. In S. Divjak (Ed.), *Nation, culture, and citizenship* (pp. 35–46). Beograd: Službeni list SRJ. [in Serbian]

Heywood, A. (2004). *Politics*. Beograd: Clio. [in Serbian]

Jevtimijević, V. (2008). *North Kosovo through History until the End of 20th Century*. Beograd: Službeni glasnik. [in Serbian]

Kuljić, T. (2010). The memory of Titoism: hegemony frameworks. *Philosophy and society 21*(2), 225–250. https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1002225K [in Serbian]

Mandić, M., Sivački, A. (2015). Language and ethnopolitical conflict: the case of Albanians in contemporary Beograd. In A. Pavlović, G. P. Zaharijević, G. Pudar Draško & R. Halili (Eds.), *The figure of the enemy: Rethinking Serbian-Albanian relations* (pp. 261–282). Beograd: IFDT, KPZ Beton. [in Serbian]

Marković-Savić, O. (2018). *Ethnicity. Sociological Research of Ethnicity in the Northern Part of Kosovska Mitrovica*. Kosovska Mitrovica: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Prištini. [in Serbian]

Marković-Savić, O. (2019). Kosovska Mitrovica – A contribution to the recent history of the city and a sociological understanding of the causes of ethnic division. In J. Petrović, V. Miltojević & I. Trotsuk (Eds.), *Sociology in XXI century: challenges and perspectives* (pp. 305–316). Niš-Beograd: University of Niš, Faculty of Philosophy, Serbian Sociological Association.

Matić, M. (1998). *Myth and Politics: Discussing the Foundations of Political Culture.* Beograd: Faculty of political science, Čigoja štampa. [in Serbian]

Miller, W. L., White, S., & Heywood, P. (1998). *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Petranović, B. (1988). History of Yugoslavia 1918–1988. Book 3, *Socialist Yugoslavia*: 1945–1988. Beograd: Nolit. [in Serbian]

Stevanović, B. (2008). *Democratic Principles and Political and Cultural Values.* Niš: Faculty of Philosophy. [in Serbian]

Stokke, K., Selboe, E. (2009). Symbolic representation as a political practice. In O. Törnquist, N. Webster & K. Stokke (Eds.), *Rethinking popular representation* (pp. 59–78). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230102095_4

Šutović, M. (2008). *Kosovo between Order and Anomie*. Beograd: Čigoja štampa. [in Serbian]

Troch, P. (2018). Socialist urban development in Kosovska Mitrovica – Compressed socio-spatial duality in a medium-sized industrial city in Yugoslavia's underdeveloped south. *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju*, *XXV*(2), 33–61.

Troch, P. (2019). Social dynamics and nationhood in employment politics in the Trepča mining complex in socialist Kosovo (the 1960s). *Labor History*, *60*(3), 217–234. https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2019.1533747

IDENTITET I SIMBOLIČKE REPREZENTACIJE POLITIČKIH VREDNOSTI: PRIMER DRUŠTVENIH ORGANIZACIJA U KOSOVSKOJ MITROVICI

Apstrakt

Kolektivna identifikacija deo je dijalektike društva u kojoj pojedinci učestvuju kao akteri, nastojeći da definišu svoj socijalni svet u skladu sa objektivno uvrđenim značenjima društvene stvarnosti. Kolektivitet pretpostavlja osećaj pripadnosti, čemu prethodi konstruisanje identiteta putem odnosa subjektivne i objektivne dimenzije društvene stvarnosti. Učestvujući u dvostrukoj internalizaciji kako sopstvenog identiteta tako i društvenog sveta, društveni akteri se različito pozicioniraju unutar tzv. simboličkog univerzuma. Tome posebno doprinosi proces pounutrivanja institucionalnog poretka i institucionalno zasnovanih podsvetova. Društvene organizacije mogu intencionalno i neintencionalno uticati na stvaranje višestruke lojalnosti, koja se izražava u raznovrsnosti kolektiviteta i identiteta. Tada neretko govorimo o nameravanim i nenameravanim posledicama nameravanih akcija društvenih organizacija. Uzimajući u obzir društveni ideal kao motiv identifikacije među akterima, koji vrše srodne društvene uloge i pripadnici su sličnog ili različitog socijalnog porekla i kolektiviteta, očekuje se da će oni, uz izvesnu solidarnost i odanost, deliti i određena materijalna i simbolička sredstva. Predmet ovog rada je analiza procesa reprezentacije i internalizacije podinstitucionalnih poredaka na osnovu kojih dolazi do usvajanja određenih političkih

vrednosti među pripadnicima određenih društvenih organizacija u Kosovskoj Mitrovici. Primenom društveno-istorijskog pristupa, osnovni cilj je da se opišu simboličke reprezentacije „bratstva", „jedinstva", „slobode", „jednakosti", „ljudskih prava", „solidarnosti" i „demo-kratije" od strane društvenih organizacija, kao i prakse u kojima se može prepoznati internalizacija ovih vrednosti. Analizom se ukazuje na određene ideale društveno-političkog poretka koje je proučavana populacija imala i ka kojima je, pretpostavlja se, relativno trajno težila.

Ključne reči: identitet, simboličke reprezentacije, internalizacija, društvene organizacije, Kosovska Mitrovica